Deflationary truth and the Liar

DOI10.1023/A:1004382815082zbMath0942.03005MaRDI QIDQ1818379

Keith Simmons

Publication date: 4 January 2000

Published in: Journal of Philosophical Logic (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

theory of truthnature of truthparadox of the liarsemantical paradox

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations (03A05)

Related Items (9)

Tarski on the necessity reading of convention T ⋮ Why the liar does not matter ⋮ Minimalism about truth: special issue introduction ⋮ Three questions for minimalism ⋮ This is not an instance of (E) ⋮ McGee on Horwich ⋮ Epistemicism and the liar ⋮ Truth via anaphorically unrestricted quantifiers ⋮ Can deflationists be dialetheists?

Cites Work

• Logic of paradox revisited
• Truth and reflection
• Maximal consistent sets of instances of Tarski's schema (T)
• The liar paradox
• The logic of paradox
• Outline of a Theory of Truth
• A note on the moment structure of the multitype Galton-Watson process
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