Rationality, path independence, and the power structure
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Publication:1820656
DOI10.1016/0022-0531(86)90079-7zbMath0614.90009OpenAlexW2055633707MaRDI QIDQ1820656
Publication date: 1986
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(86)90079-7
Related Items (4)
Path independence in serial-parallel data processing ⋮ Sequential path independence and social choice ⋮ Choice procedures and power structure in social decisions ⋮ Weakly implementable social choice rules
Cites Work
- On the frontier between possibility and impossibility theorems in social choice
- Pareto optimality and the decisive power structure with expansion consistency conditions
- Weak path independence
- Impossibility theorems without collective rationality
- Intransitive social indifference and the Arrow dilemma
- Acyclic Collective Choice Rules
- Path Independence, Rationality, and Social Choice
- Social Choice Theory: A Re-Examination
- Consistency, Rationality and Collective Choice
- General Possibility Theorems for Group Decisions
- A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision
- Rational Selection of Decision Functions
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