Stable matching with preferences derived from a psychological model
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Publication:1820991
DOI10.1016/0167-6377(86)90072-6zbMath0615.90006OpenAlexW2042544885MaRDI QIDQ1820991
Michael A. Trick, John J. III Bartholdi
Publication date: 1986
Published in: Operations Research Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0167-6377(86)90072-6
Analysis of algorithms and problem complexity (68Q25) Decision theory (91B06) Utility theory (91B16) Individual preferences (91B08) Social choice (91B14)
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- An efficient algorithm for the “stable roommates” problem
- Ms. Machiavelli and the Stable Matching Problem
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- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
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