Auctions, public tenders, and fair division games: An axiomatic approach

DOI10.1016/0165-4896(86)90029-6zbMath0615.90110OpenAlexW1997781386MaRDI QIDQ1821045

Güth, Werner

Publication date: 1986

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4896(86)90029-6

zbMATH Keywords

games with incomplete informationincentive compatibilitybiddingAuctionsfair division gamespublic tenders

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Game theory (91A99) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (4)

An indirect evolutionary justification of risk neutral bidding in fair division games ⋮ A comparison of pricing rules for auctions and fair division games ⋮ On ring formation in auctions ⋮ Community projects: an experimental analysis of a fair implementation process

Cites Work

• A comparison of pricing rules for auctions and fair division games
• The Conditional Auction Mechanism for Sharing a Surplus
• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
• Optimal Auction Design
• Games with Incomplete Information Played by ‘Bayesian’ Players, Part III. The Basic Probability Distribution of the Game
• Fair Net Trades
• Unnamed Item

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