The core of a game with a continuum of players and finite coalitions: The model and some results

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Publication:1821708

DOI10.1016/0165-4896(86)90032-6zbMath0616.90106OpenAlexW2133992953MaRDI QIDQ1821708

Myrna Holtz Wooders, Mamoru Kaneko

Publication date: 1986

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://purl.umn.edu/2383




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