The core of a game with a continuum of players and finite coalitions: The model and some results
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1821708
DOI10.1016/0165-4896(86)90032-6zbMath0616.90106OpenAlexW2133992953MaRDI QIDQ1821708
Myrna Holtz Wooders, Mamoru Kaneko
Publication date: 1986
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://purl.umn.edu/2383
corecooperative gamemarket gamecontinuum of playersnonemptiness of the corefinite coalitionsnonemptiness conditions
Related Items
The nonatomic assignment model ⋮ Inessentiality of large groups and the approximate core property: An equivalence theorem ⋮ Price controls, non-price quality competition, and the nonexistence of competitive equilibrium ⋮ Replica economies with congested public goods ⋮ The nonemptiness of the \(f\)-core of a game without side payments ⋮ A Tiebout theorem ⋮ Continuum economies with finite coalitions: Core, equilibria, and widespread externalities ⋮ The core of a continuum economy with widespread externalities and finite coalitions: From finite to continuum economies ⋮ Maskin monotonicity and infinite individuals ⋮ Stability in matching markets with peer effects ⋮ Dynamic club formation with coordination ⋮ Market Games and Clubs ⋮ On the nonemptiness of approximate cores of large games ⋮ Surplus efficiency of ex ante investments in matching markets with nontransferabilities ⋮ Occupational choice, incentives and wealth distribution ⋮ The core and related solution concepts for infinite assignment games ⋮ Approximate stable solutions in infinite tree problems ⋮ On the uniqueness of the solution to a large linear assignment problem ⋮ Large random graphs in pseudo-metric spaces ⋮ Matching with ownership ⋮ Anonymous price taking equilibrium in Tiebout economies with a continuum of agents: existence and characterization ⋮ The core of the inductive limit of a direct system of economies with a communication structure ⋮ Stable matching with double infinity of workers and firms ⋮ Some corrections to claims about the literature in Engl and Scotchmer (1996) ⋮ Household formation and markets
Cites Work
- Approximate cores of replica games and economies. I: Replica games, externalities, and approximate cores
- Information patterns and Nash equilibria in extensive games: I
- The epsilon core of a large replica game
- On the cores of economies with indivisible commodities and a continuum of traders
- The central assignment game and the assignment markets
- Cores of partitioning games
- The assignment game. I: The core
- Non-cooperative games
- Values of Non-Atomic Games
- Approximate Cores of Large Games
- Markets with a Continuum of Traders
- Quasi-Cores in a Monetary Economy with Nonconvex Preferences
- The Core of an N Person Game
- A Limit Theorem on the Core of an Economy
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item