Core implementation via dynamic game forms

DOI10.1007/BF00295860zbMath0679.90004MaRDI QIDQ1823121

V. W. Kolpin

Publication date: 1989

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

strong equilibriumsequential dictatorshipimplementation of social choice correspondences\(\alpha\)-core\(\beta\)- core

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (3)

Spoilers, blocking coalitions, and the core ⋮ ``How characteristic are characteristic functions? ⋮ Equivalent game forms and coalitional power

Cites Work

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• Stable extensive game forms with perfect information
• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• α-Stable Extensive Game Forms

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