Small talk and cooperation: A note on bounded rationality

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(89)90065-3zbMath0679.90101OpenAlexW2027327055MaRDI QIDQ1823173

Eitan Zemel

Publication date: 1989

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/papers/803.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

repeated gamesfinite automatabounded rationalitycommunication channel

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (12)

Bounded computational capacity equilibrium ⋮ Finite automata play repeated prisoner's dilemma with information processing costs ⋮ Rationality and bounded rationality ⋮ Game Theory and Strategic Complexity ⋮ Equilibrium of repeated games with cost of implementation ⋮ Predicting the effects of intervention and sabotage in a bounded complex game ⋮ An experimental study of finitely and infinitely repeated linear public goods games ⋮ Program equilibrium ⋮ Codification schemes and finite automata ⋮ Strategic entropy and complexity in repeated games ⋮ Distributed games ⋮ Computability, complexity and economics

Cites Work

• Bounded complexity justifies cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
• Cooperation and bounded recall
• Finite automata play the repeated prisoner's dilemma
• Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies
• Finite Rationality and Interpersonal Complexity in Repeated Games
• The Structure of Nash Equilibrium in Repeated Games with Finite Automata
• Unnamed Item

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