Evolutionary stability in the repeated prisoner's dilemma

DOI10.1016/0040-5809(89)90027-0zbMath0679.92023OpenAlexW2044083728MaRDI QIDQ1823196

Joseph Farrell, Roger Ware

Publication date: 1989

Published in: Theoretical Population Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0040-5809(89)90027-0

zbMATH Keywords

evolutionary stabilityconflictcooperative strategiesPrisoner's dilemmaaltruistic behaviorfinite mixture of pure strategiesTIT-FOR-TAT

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Problems related to evolution (92D15) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Animal behavior (92D50)

Related Items (16)

Inefficient stage Nash is not stable ⋮ Lotka-Volterra equation and replicator dynamics: New issues in classification ⋮ Evolutionary game theory: a renaissance ⋮ Evolutionarily stable strategies in the repeated prisoner's dilemma ⋮ Reciprocal cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma repeated with random horizon ⋮ Influence of bolstering network reciprocity in the evolutionary spatial prisoner's dilemma game: a perspective ⋮ In and out of equilibrium. I: Evolution of strategies in repeated games with discounting. ⋮ Evolutionary dynamics of the spatial prisoner's dilemma with self-inhibition ⋮ Pareto efficiency, simple game stability, and social structure in finitely repeated games ⋮ On the iterated prisoner's dilemma in a finite population ⋮ Evolutionary stability in repeated games played by finite automata ⋮ EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION IN A SPATIAL PRISONER'S DILEMMA ⋮ Evolutionary game dynamics ⋮ An escape from ``the prisoner's dilemma ⋮ Best reply player against mixed evolutionarily stable strategy user ⋮ Time-dependent animal conflicts. I: The symmetric case

Cites Work

• Finite Rationality and Interpersonal Complexity in Repeated Games
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