Credible debate equilibria

DOI10.1007/BF01832923zbMath0681.90008MaRDI QIDQ1823826

David Austen-Smith

Publication date: 1990

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

equilibriumincomplete informationpolitical economicstransmission of informationcredibility in debateendogenous agenda setting game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Mathematical sociology (including anthropology) (91D99)

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Cheap talk games with two-senders and different modes of communication, Cheap talk games may have unique, informative equilibrium outcomes, Modelling the role of information in elections, Information aggregation and preference heterogeneity in committees, Almost fully revealing cheap talk with imperfectly informed senders

Cites Work

• Sincere voting in models of legislative elections
• Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
• Veto Threats: Rhetoric in a Bargaining Game
• Sequential Equilibria
• Strategic Information Transmission