Far-sighted equilibria in 2\(\times 2\), non-cooperative, repeated games

DOI10.1007/BF00135094zbMath0681.90099MaRDI QIDQ1823884

Jan Aaftink

Publication date: 1989

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

repeated gamesstrategic formdeparture gamesfar-sighted equilibriumtwo-person simultaneous-move game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items

Extending the notion of rationality of selfish agents: second order Nash equilibria ⋮ Axioms for the outcomes of negotiation in matrix games

Cites Work

• Equilibria for far-sighted players
• Staying power in sequential games
• Strong perfect equilibrium in supergames
• Preplay negotiations and the prisoner's dilemma
• Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies
• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• A simple model of imperfect competition where 4 are few and 6 are many
• Non-cooperative games

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