Weak strategy proofness: The case of nonbinary social choice functions
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1824519
DOI10.1007/BF00135095zbMath0682.90002OpenAlexW2083149501MaRDI QIDQ1824519
Publication date: 1989
Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00135095
strategy-proofnessdictatorshipoligarchybinarinessnonimposed, binary, multivalued social choice mechanism
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Manipulation of nonimposed, nonoligarchic, nonbinary group decision rules
- On the frontier between possibility and impossibility theorems in social choice
- Coalitional manipulation and the Pareto rule
- Limited resoluteness and strategic voting: The case of linear sincere preference orderings
- On a class of strictly nonmanipulable collective choice rules
- Pareto optimality and the decisive power structure with expansion consistency conditions
- Threats, counter-threats and strategic manipulation for non-binary group decision rules
- Strategic voting under minimally binary group decision functions
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- Manipulation of social decision functions
- Intransitive social indifference and the Arrow dilemma
- Monotonicity, Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives and Strategy- Proofness of Social Decision Functions
- Threats, Counter-Threats, and Strategic Voting
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- Counter-threats and Strategic Manipulation under Voting Schemes
- The Manipulation of Social Choice Mechanisms that Do Not Leave "Too Much" to Chance
This page was built for publication: Weak strategy proofness: The case of nonbinary social choice functions
