Limit properties of power indices in a class of representative systems

DOI10.1007/BF01358799zbMath0682.90110MaRDI QIDQ1824577

Shigeo Muto

Publication date: 1989

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

limit propertiesShapley-Shubik indexrepresentative systemspolitical economicsfair representationBanzhaf indices

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Social choice (91B14) Mathematical sociology (including anthropology) (91D99)

Related Items (1)

The Banzhaf index in representative systems with multiple political parties

Cites Work

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• Power indices in a discretely proportional representative system with a large number of voters
• Power and taxes in a multi-commodity economy
• Limit theorems for sampling from finite populations
• Measure-Based Values of Market Games
• The Partition Value
• Values of Non-Atomic Games
• Mathematical Properties of the Banzhaf Power Index

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