A note on a theorem of Aumann and Drèze

DOI10.1007/BF01358804zbMath0683.90103OpenAlexW2159802739MaRDI QIDQ1825149

Benny Moldovanu

Publication date: 1989

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01358804

zbMATH Keywords

reduced gamesnon-side-payment gamessections of coresside-payments games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items (2)

Stable bargained equilibria for assignment games without side payments ⋮ Price indeterminacy and bargaining in a market with indivisibilities

Cites Work

• An axiomatization of the core of cooperative games without side payments
• On the reduced game property and its converse
• Cooperative games with coalition structures
• Geometric Properties of the Kernel, Nucleolus, and Related Solution Concepts

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