An application of the theory of social situations to repeated games

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(89)90082-3zbMath0683.90107OpenAlexW2068863709MaRDI QIDQ1825153

Joseph Greenberg

Publication date: 1989

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(89)90082-3

zbMATH Keywords

discountinginfinitely repeated gamessocial situationsnondiscriminating stationary stable standardperfect equilibrium paths

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (5)

Stability, sequential rationality, and subgame consistency ⋮ Coalitions, leadership, and social norms: The power of suggestion in games ⋮ Conservative stable standards of behavior and \(\varphi\)-stable sets ⋮ Roth-Postlewaite stability and von Neumann-Morgenstern stability ⋮ Stable agreements in infinitely repeated games

Cites Work

• Renegotiation in repeated games
• On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting
• The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
• Unnamed Item

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