Effects of fixed costs in two-person sequential bargaining

DOI10.1007/BF00139238zbMath0684.90104OpenAlexW4247873984MaRDI QIDQ1825776

Dan S. Felsenthal, Amnon Rapoport, Eythan Weg

Publication date: 1990

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00139238

zbMATH Keywords

experimental economicstwo-person sequential bargainingperfect equilibrium outcomesunequal bargaining cost conditionsunlimited number of rounds

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (7)

Forward induction and entry deterrence: an experiment ⋮ Bargaining over a climate deal: deadline and delay ⋮ Two-person sequential bargaining behavior with exogenous breakdown ⋮ Two-person bargaining behavior in fixed discounting factors games with infinite horizon ⋮ The bargaining trap ⋮ On the robustness of perfect equilibrium in fixed cost sequential bargaining under an isomorphic transformation ⋮ Finite horizon bargaining with outside options and threat points

Cites Work

• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• Non-cooperative games
• The Bargaining Problem
• Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
• The Role of Information in Bargaining: An Experimental Study
• Two-Person Cooperative Games
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