More on the `anti-folk theorem'

DOI10.1016/0304-4068(89)90025-6zbMath0684.90107OpenAlexW2043673527MaRDI QIDQ1825777

Jordi Massó, Robert W. Rosenthal

Publication date: 1989

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(89)90025-6

zbMATH Keywords

discounted repeated gameslong-run average criterionNash- equilibrium playsunobservable individual deviations

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items

Undiscounted equilibrium payoffs of repeated games with a continuum of players ⋮ On the existence of pure strategy equilibria in games with a continuum of players

Cites Work

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• Equilibrium in supergames with the overtaking criterion
• Information patterns and Nash equilibria in extensive games: I
• Some remarks on the folk theorem in game theory
• Equilibrium points of nonatomic games
• Equilibrium Points for Games with Infinitely Many Players