Efficiency and equilibrium in the electronic mail game; the general case

DOI10.1016/j.tcs.2003.12.016zbMath1073.91006OpenAlexW2025392516MaRDI QIDQ1826637

Nicola Dimitri

Publication date: 6 August 2004

Published in: Theoretical Computer Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tcs.2003.12.016

zbMATH Keywords

knowledgegamescoordinated actions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Probabilistic games; gambling (91A60)

Cites Work

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• Approximating common knowledge with common beliefs
• Operating systems. An advanced course
• Agreeing to disagree
• Approximate common knowledge and co-ordination: Recent lessons from game theory
• Coordination in an email game without ``Almost common knowledge
• Knowledge and common knowledge in a distributed environment
• Coordinated action in the electronic mail game

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