Non-cooperative implementation: A survey of recent results
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Publication:1837610
DOI10.1016/0165-4896(82)90073-7zbMath0507.90007OpenAlexW2128600661MaRDI QIDQ1837610
Publication date: 1982
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4896(82)90073-7
votingpublic goodsbargainingcollective decision-makingincentive compatibilitystrategyproofdominance solvabilitydominant, maximin risk-avert strategiesnoncooperative behaviorstrategic decentralization
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Cites Work
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