Special domains and nonmanipulability

DOI10.1016/0165-4896(80)90007-4zbMath0508.90005OpenAlexW2014391720MaRDI QIDQ1838418

Fred W. Roush, Kim Hang Kim

Publication date: 1980

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4896(80)90007-4

zbMATH Keywords

strategyproofnessrestricted domainsnondictatorial, nonmanipulable social choice function

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (12)

Dictatorship on top-circular domains ⋮ On the equivalence of coalitional and individual strategy-proofness properties ⋮ The publications of Ki Hang Kim ⋮ A new informational base for social choice ⋮ Tops-only domains ⋮ Hotelling-Downs equilibria: moving beyond plurality variants ⋮ Individual versus group strategy-proofness: when do they coincide? ⋮ Circular domains ⋮ Kelly's conjecture ⋮ Another induction proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem ⋮ Unanimous and Strategy-Proof Probabilistic Rules for Single-Peaked Preference Profiles on Graphs ⋮ Structured preferences: a literature survey

Cites Work

• Collective rationality and strategy-proofness of group decision rules
• A condition for Nash-stability under binary and democratic group decision functions
• Characterization of domains admitting nondictatorial social welfare functions and nonmanipulable voting procedures

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