Truth and paradox

DOI10.1007/BF00302338zbMath0512.03002MaRDI QIDQ1839240

Publication date: 1982

Published in: Journal of Philosophical Logic (Search for Journal in Brave)

self-reference Tarskian biconditionals semantical paradoxes deepest grade of instability Liar paradox type reducible model semantically closed language

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other nonclassical logic (03B60) Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations (03A05) Logic with extra quantifiers and operators (03C80)

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