Firms' R\&D decisions under incomplete information

DOI10.1016/S0377-2217(99)00427-0zbMath0980.90040OpenAlexW1976123196MaRDI QIDQ1840865

Yaroslav D. Sergeyev, Damiano B. Silipo, Vladimir A. Grishagin

Publication date: 12 March 2002

Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0377-2217(99)00427-0

zbMATH Keywords

incomplete informationrent dissipationpatent races

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Management decision making, including multiple objectives (90B50)

Related Items (3)

Compulsory licenses in the pharmaceutical industry: pricing and R\&D strategies ⋮ Mixed oligopoly, cost-reducing research and development, and privatisation ⋮ Dynamic investment strategies and leadership in product innovation

Cites Work

• Dynamic games of innovation
• Market Structure and Innovation
• Perfect Equilibrium in a Model of a Race
• The Existence of Equilibrium in Discontinuous Economic Games, I: Theory
• Racing with Uncertainty
• Comparative Statics of Contests and Rent-Seeking Games

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