Continuous approximations of stochastic evolutionary game dynamics

DOI10.1006/jeth.1999.2596zbMath1073.91513OpenAlexW2086176094WikidataQ57918130 ScholiaQ57918130MaRDI QIDQ1841177

Rajiv Sarin, Valentina Corradi

Publication date: 21 June 2001

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/4bbee57eb13218072f26e57e77f087a861366289

zbMATH Keywords

continuous approximationimitation processstochastic evolutionary game dynamics

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15)

Related Items (10)

Time averages, recurrence and transience in the stochastic replicator dynamics ⋮ A note on adjusted replicator dynamics in iterated games ⋮ Stochastic analysis and optimal control of a donation game system with non-uniform interaction rates and Gram-Schmidt orthogonalization procedure ⋮ Evolution and equilibrium under inexact information. ⋮ The frequency-dependent Wright-Fisher model: diffusive and non-diffusive approximations ⋮ The long-run behavior of the stochastic replicator dynamics ⋮ Evolutionary game dynamics in a Wright-Fisher process ⋮ Metastability in stochastic replicator dynamics ⋮ The propagation of chaos for interacting individuals in a large population ⋮ Evolutionary game dynamics and the analysis of agent-based imitation models: the long run, the medium run and the importance of global analysis

Cites Work

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• Learning through reinforcement and replicator dynamics
• Musical chairs: Modeling noisy evolution
• Continuous approximation of dynamical systems with randomly matched individuals
• Uniform Convergence in Probability and Stochastic Equicontinuity
• Steady State Learning and Nash Equilibrium

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