Economists' models of learning
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Publication:1841181
DOI10.1006/jeth.2000.2701zbMath0973.91505OpenAlexW2075740959MaRDI QIDQ1841181
Publication date: 26 November 2001
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.2000.2701
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