On cores and indivisibility

DOI10.1016/0304-4068(74)90033-0zbMath0281.90014OpenAlexW4362223083WikidataQ101133556 ScholiaQ101133556MaRDI QIDQ1843369

Publication date: 1974

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(74)90033-0

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Trade models (91B60) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

Related Items

Enrollment manipulations in school choice ⋮ House-swapping with divorcing and engaged pairs ⋮ The existence and computation of competitive equilibria in markets with an indivisible commodity ⋮ Object allocation via deferred-acceptance: strategy-proofness and comparative statics ⋮ Strategy-proof, efficient, and nonbossy quota allocations ⋮ Constrained school choice ⋮ Why do popular mechanisms lack efficiency in random environments? ⋮ Random decentralized market processes for stable job matchings with competitive salaries ⋮ Transferring ownership of public housing to existing tenants: a market design approach ⋮ Improving schools through school choice: a market design approach ⋮ Consistent bargaining conjectures in marriage and matching ⋮ A solution to the random assignment problem on the full preference domain ⋮ Manipulation via endowments in exchange markets with indivisible goods ⋮ Exchange in a general market with indivisible goods ⋮ The relationship between top trading cycles mechanism and top trading cycles and chains mechanism ⋮ On top responsiveness and strict core stability ⋮ Investments and the holdup problem in a matching market ⋮ Farsighted house allocation ⋮ Top trading with fixed tie-breaking in markets with indivisible goods ⋮ Income distribution and housing prices: an assignment model approach ⋮ A simple sufficient condition for strong implementation ⋮ School choice: impossibilities for affirmative action ⋮ On the cores of economies with indivisible commodities and a continuum of traders ⋮ The Pareto-dominant strategy-proof and fair rule for problems with indivisible goods ⋮ Endogenous budget constraints in the assignment game ⋮ House allocation with fractional endowments ⋮ The Pareto-stability concept is a natural solution concept for discrete matching markets with indifferences ⋮ Secure implementation in Shapley-Scarf housing markets ⋮ The difference indifference makes in strategy-proof allocation of objects ⋮ Implementation in adaptive better-response dynamics: towards a general theory of bounded rationality in mechanisms ⋮ The central assignment game and the assignment markets ⋮ Cores of partitioning games ⋮ Indivisible commodities and an equivalence theorem on the strong core ⋮ Weakly fair allocations and strategy-proofness ⋮ A new perspective on Kesten's school choice with consent idea ⋮ Subgame perfect implementation of stable matchings in marriage problems ⋮ The coordinate-wise core for multiple-type housing markets is second-best incentive compatible ⋮ On the existence of a strictly strong Nash equilibrium under the student-optimal deferred acceptance algorithm ⋮ An experimental study on the incentives of the probabilistic serial mechanism ⋮ Transplant quality and patients' preferences in paired kidney exchange ⋮ The core of some location games ⋮ A constructive proof of the ordinal efficiency welfare theorem ⋮ Incentive compatible market design with applications ⋮ An efficient multi-item dynamic auction with budget constrained bidders ⋮ Two simple variations of top trading cycles ⋮ A short proof for the characterization of the core in housing markets ⋮ How to efficiently allocate houses under price controls? ⋮ On the solution of \(w\)-stable sets ⋮ A computational approach to the multi-period many-to-one matching with ties ⋮ School choice and information: An experimental study on matching mechanisms ⋮ Non-bossiness ⋮ On the operation of multiple matching markets ⋮ House exchange and residential segregation in networks ⋮ Age-based preferences in paired kidney exchange ⋮ Axiomatization of the Shapley value using the balanced cycle contributions property ⋮ Kidney exchange: an egalitarian mechanism ⋮ The core of Shapley-Scarf markets with couples ⋮ A dynamic recontracting process for multiple-type housing markets ⋮ Coalitional strategy-proof house allocation ⋮ Ordinal efficiency and the polyhedral separating hyperplane theorem ⋮ Strategy-proofness and the core in house allocation problems ⋮ Noncooperative formation of coalitions in hedonic games ⋮ Efficient assignment respecting priorities ⋮ Unique stability in simple coalition formation games ⋮ A model of partnership formation ⋮ Researching with whom? Stability and manipulation ⋮ Random paths to stability in the roommate problem ⋮ Coalition-proof Nash allocation in a barter game with multiple indivisible goods ⋮ Stability and Nash implementation in matching markets with couples ⋮ House allocation with existing tenants: a characterization ⋮ The probabilistic serial mechanism with private endowments ⋮ Exchange of indivisible goods and indifferences: the top trading absorbing sets mechanisms ⋮ Core equivalence and welfare properties without divisible goods ⋮ Strategy-proofness and identical preferences lower bound in allocation problem of indivisible objects ⋮ Partial-matching RMS distance under translation: combinatorics and algorithms ⋮ Weak versus strong domination in a market with indivisible goods ⋮ Preference revelation games and strong cores of allocation problems with indivisibilities ⋮ The relation between non-bossiness and monotonicity ⋮ Strategy-proof social choice with exogenous indifference classes ⋮ Domination structures and multicriteria problems in N-person games ⋮ Residence exchange wanted: A stable residence exchange problem ⋮ Incentive compatibility in a market with indivisible goods ⋮ Competitive equilibrium with indivisibilities ⋮ Coalitional strategy-proofness and fairness ⋮ The complexity of economic equilibria for house allocation markets ⋮ Monotonicity and Nash implementation in matching markets with contracts ⋮ Group incentive compatibility for matching with contracts ⋮ On the convergence of swap dynamics to Pareto-optimal matchings ⋮ Influence in private-goods allocation ⋮ Random mechanisms for house allocation with existing tenants ⋮ Competitive equilibria in Shapley-Scarf markets with couples ⋮ Core and competitive equilibria with indivisibilities ⋮ The 'marriage game': An assignment problem with indivisibilities ⋮ Permutation games: Another class of totally balanced games ⋮ The epsilon core of a large replica game ⋮ A note on the strong core of a market with indivisible goods ⋮ Price indeterminacy and bargaining in a market with indivisibilities ⋮ Pairwise kidney exchange ⋮ Pairwise kidney exchange: comment ⋮ Strategy-proofness and the strict core in a market with indivisibilities ⋮ Improving the Chilean College Admissions System ⋮ Incentives in landing slot problems ⋮ Fairness and efficiency in strategy-proof object allocation mechanisms ⋮ Favoring Eagerness for Remaining Items: Designing Efficient, Fair, and Strategyproof Mechanisms ⋮ Efficient lottery design ⋮ Minimal consistent enlargements of the immediate acceptance rule and the top trading cycles rule in school choice ⋮ Unnamed Item ⋮ Stability Representations of Many-to-One Matching Problems: An Integer Optimization Approach ⋮ Decentralised exchange, out-of-equilibrium dynamics and convergence to efficiency ⋮ A reformulation of von Neumann-Morgenstern stability: \(m\)-stability ⋮ Arrovian theorems for economic domains: Assignments, matchings and pairings ⋮ Strategy-proof assignment on the full preference domain ⋮ House allocation with existing tenants: an equivalence ⋮ Do pure indivisibilities prevent core equivalence? Core equivalence theorem in an atomless economy with purely indivisible commodities only ⋮ The Complexity of Computing the Random Priority Allocation Matrix ⋮ ReGale: some memorable results ⋮ My encounters with David Gale ⋮ Core and equilibria in an assembled product industry ⋮ Implementation in partial equilibrium ⋮ Competitive equilibrium and singleton cores in generalized matching problems ⋮ Two-sided matching with indifferences ⋮ Existence of a competitive equilibrium when all goods are indivisible ⋮ Alternative characterizations of the top trading cycles rule in housing markets ⋮ Strategy-proof school choice mechanisms with minimum quotas and initial endowments ⋮ Incentives and implementation in allocation problems with externalities ⋮ Subquadratic algorithms for succinct stable matching ⋮ Strategy-proof Pareto-improvement ⋮ Menu mechanisms ⋮ ON TWO THEOREMS OF QUINZII AND RENT CONTROLLED HOUSING ALLOCATION IN SWEDEN ⋮ Multi resource allocation with partial preferences ⋮ Strategyproof allocation mechanisms with endowments and M-convex distributional constraints ⋮ Random Serial Dictatorship: The One and Only ⋮ Efficient and incentive compatible exchange of real-time information ⋮ A task-allocation problem ⋮ School choice with neighbors ⋮ On reachable assignments in cycles ⋮ Essential data, budget sets and rationalization ⋮ Symposium on revealed preference analysis ⋮ The housing problem and revealed preference theory: duality and an application ⋮ Reclaim-proof allocation of indivisible objects ⋮ Pareto optimality in coalition formation ⋮ Strategy-proof tie-breaking in matching with priorities ⋮ Unnamed Item ⋮ Implementing quotas in university admissions: an experimental analysis ⋮ A general equivalence theorem for allocation of indivisible objects ⋮ Consistent strategy-proof assignment by hierarchical exchange ⋮ Hardness results for stable exchange problems ⋮ Graph Cycles and Olympiad Problems ⋮ An incompatibility between recursive unanimity and strategy-proofness in two-sided matching problems ⋮ Incentive compatibility and feasibility constraints in housing markets ⋮ Serial dictatorship and Pareto optimality ⋮ Cooperative Games (Von Neumann-Morgenstern Stable Sets) ⋮ Market Design ⋮ Indivisible commodities and the nonemptiness of the weak core ⋮ Welfare and stability in senior matching markets ⋮ Random serial dictatorship and ordinally efficient contracts ⋮ Deferred acceptance algorithms: history, theory, practice, and open questions ⋮ On the Shapley-Scarf economy: The case of multiple types of indivisible goods ⋮ EQUILIBRIUM IN A DISCRETE EXCHANGE ECONOMY WITH REGIONAL SUB-ECONOMIES ⋮ The core of endo-status games and one-to-one ordinal preference games ⋮ Coalition strategy-proofness and monotonicity in Shapley-Scarf housing markets ⋮ On classical and modern marriage problems ⋮ On two competing mechanisms for priority-based allocation problems ⋮ School choice: an experimental study ⋮ Competitive equilibria in economies with multiple indivisible and multiple divisible commodities ⋮ Erratum to ``Do pure indivisibilities prevent core equivalence? Core equivalence theorem in an atomless economy with purely indivisible commodities only ⋮ Competitive equilibria with indivisible goods ⋮ Computing the Deficiency of Housing Markets with Duplicate Houses ⋮ A new solution to the random assignment problem. ⋮ Characterizations of the sequential priority rules in the assignment of object types ⋮ On responsiveness of top trading cycles mechanism to priority-based affirmative action ⋮ An impossibility result for housing markets with fractional endowments ⋮ Affirmative action under common school priorities: the top trading cycles mechanism case ⋮ Algorithms for Pareto optimal exchange with bounded exchange cycles ⋮ On obvious strategy-proofness and single-peakedness ⋮ Notions of anonymity for object assignment: impossibility theorems ⋮ Short trading cycles: paired kidney exchange with strict ordinal preferences ⋮ The Myopic Stable Set for Social Environments ⋮ Responsive affirmative action in school choice: a comparison study ⋮ A COOPERATIVE APPROACH TO QUEUE ALLOCATION OF INDIVISIBLE OBJECTS ⋮ Priority-driven behaviors under the Boston mechanism ⋮ On the welfare effects of affirmative actions in school choice ⋮ On the terminology of economic design: a critical assessment and some proposals ⋮ Approximability of Economic Equilibrium for Housing Markets with Duplicate Houses ⋮ Size versus truthfulness in the house allocation problem ⋮ Competitive Equilibrium with Indivisible Goods and Generic Budgets ⋮ A Polynomial Time Market Mechanism ⋮ Matching with restricted trade ⋮ Strategy-Proofness Makes the Difference: Deferred-Acceptance with Responsive Priorities ⋮ An elementary non-constructive proof of the non-emptiness of the core of the housing market of Shapley and Scarf ⋮ Matching with partners and projects ⋮ Top trading cycles, consistency, and acyclic priorities for house allocation with existing tenants ⋮ Walrasian equilibrium as limit of competitive equilibria without divisible goods ⋮ Random assignments on preference domains with a tier structure ⋮ The exchange-stable marriage problem ⋮ Nash implementation in private good economies with single-plateaued preferences and in matching problems ⋮ Coalitional stochastic stability in games, networks and markets ⋮ Roth-Postlewaite stability and von Neumann-Morgenstern stability ⋮ Gale’s Fixed Tax for Exchanging Houses ⋮ Fair in the Eyes of Others ⋮ Gainers and losers from market integration ⋮ Equilibrium and matching under price controls ⋮ Indivisibilities, lotteries, and sunspot equilibria ⋮ On the complexity of price equilibria ⋮ Interdistrict school choice: a theory of student assignment ⋮ Cores and mechanisms in restricted housing markets ⋮ Core and top trading cycles in a market with indivisible goods and externalities ⋮ Trading probabilities along cycles ⋮ On the integration of Shapley-Scarf markets ⋮ Object allocation via immediate-acceptance: characterizations and an affirmative action application ⋮ Allocating group housing ⋮ The core of housing markets from an agent's perspective: Is it worth sprucing up your home? ⋮ Mechanisms for trading durable goods ⋮ Mutually best matches ⋮ Existence of an equilibrium in a competitive economy with indivisibilities and money ⋮ The crawler: three equivalence results for object (re)allocation problems when preferences are single-peaked ⋮ Competitive equilibria in school assignment ⋮ Restricted housewapping games ⋮ Implementation in generalized matching problems ⋮ On the equivalence of two competing affirmative actions in school choice ⋮ On stable and efficient mechanisms for priority-based allocation problems ⋮ Random assignments on sequentially dichotomous domains ⋮ A market design approach to job rotation ⋮ Essentially stable matchings ⋮ On characterizations of the probabilistic serial mechanism involving incentive and invariance properties ⋮ Hierarchical allocation ⋮ Bundling in exchange markets with indivisible goods ⋮ The kidney exchange problem: how hard is it to find a donor? ⋮ Domains of social choice functions on which coalition strategy-proofness and maskin monotonicity are equivalent ⋮ Efficient and non-deteriorating choice. ⋮ Stable and efficient resource allocation under weak priorities ⋮ An efficient implementation of the equilibrium algorithm for housing markets with duplicate houses ⋮ A note on budget constraints and outside options in common agency ⋮ Ordinal efficiency and dominated sets of assignments. ⋮ Reordering an existing queue ⋮ On endowments and indivisibility: partial ownership in the Shapley-Scarf model ⋮ Fair student placement ⋮ Strategyproof exchange of indivisible goods. ⋮ A revelation principle for obviously strategy-proof implementation ⋮ The roommates problem revisited ⋮ Three-sided stable matchings with cyclic preferences ⋮ Housing markets through graphs ⋮ A polynomial-time algorithm to find von Neumann-Morgenstern stable matchings in marriage games ⋮ The evolution of exchange. ⋮ Monotonic and implementable solutions in generalized matching problems. ⋮ Market allocation of indivisible goods ⋮ What matters in school choice tie-breaking? How competition guides design ⋮ Swap-flexibility in the assignment of houses ⋮ Ex-post incentive compatible and individually rational assignments in housing markets with interdependent values ⋮ Approximation of incoherent probabilities ⋮ The \textit{ex ante} incentive compatible core of the assignment game. ⋮ Application of M-convex submodular flow problem to mathematical economics ⋮ Matching with single-peaked preferences ⋮ Eliciting preferences to assign positions and compensation ⋮ The problem of multiple commons: a market design approach ⋮ The existence of a unique core partition in coalition formation games ⋮ Designing mechanisms to focalize welfare-improving strategies ⋮ Size versus truncation robustness in the assignment problem ⋮ Minimal envy and popular matchings ⋮ The unbinding core for coalitional form games ⋮ The skipping-down strategy and stability in school choice problems with affirmative action: theory and experiment ⋮ Matching with indifferences: a comparison of algorithms in the context of course allocation ⋮ Group incentive compatibility in the housing market problem with weak preferences ⋮ Strategy-proofness and essentially single-valued cores revisited ⋮ Introduction to computer science and economic theory ⋮ Compromises and rewards: stable and non-manipulable probabilistic matching ⋮ On random stable partitions ⋮ On two kinds of manipulation for school choice problems ⋮ A foundation of location theory: existence of equilibrium, the welfare theorems, and core ⋮ Dynamics, stability, and foresight in the Shapley-Scarf housing market ⋮ A competitive partnership formation process ⋮ Farsighted stability of the competitive allocations in an exchange economy with indivisible goods ⋮ Strategy-proof improvements upon deferred acceptance: a maximal domain for possibility ⋮ Strategy-proof exchange under trichotomous preferences ⋮ Efficiency, stability, and commitment in senior level job matching markets ⋮ An alternative proof of a characterization of the TTC mechanism ⋮ Two further impossibility results on responsive affirmative action in school choice ⋮ Complexity of finding Pareto-efficient allocations of highest welfare ⋮ Endowments-swapping-proof house allocation ⋮ No bullying! A playful proof of Brouwer's fixed-point theorem ⋮ Fairness and efficiency for allocations with participation constraints ⋮ House allocation with existing tenants ⋮ Equilibrium in an exchange economy with multiple indivisible commodities and money ⋮ Axiomatic foundations of the core for games in effectiveness form ⋮ A new allocation rule for the housing market problem with ties ⋮ Matching with ownership ⋮ Efficient mixtures of priority rules for assigning objects ⋮ Consistency in house allocation problems ⋮ A comparison study on responsiveness of three mechanisms to affirmative action in school choice ⋮ Strategy-proof popular mechanisms ⋮ Tie-breaking and efficiency in the laboratory school choice ⋮ On the existence of stable roommate matchings ⋮ A competitive market model for indivisible commodities. ⋮ College assignment problems under constrained choice, private preferences, and risk aversion ⋮ Object reallocation problems under single-peaked preferences: two characterizations of the crawler ⋮ Serial rules in a multi-unit Shapley-Scarf market ⋮ Bipartite choices ⋮ Existence and welfare properties of equilibrium in an exchange economy with multiple divisible and indivisible commodities and linear production technologies ⋮ Deferred acceptance algorithm with retrade ⋮ Strategy-proofness and population-monotonicity for house allocation problems ⋮ Atomic cross-chain swaps with improved space, time and local time complexities ⋮ Stable and extremely unequal ⋮ On reachable assignments under dichotomous preferences ⋮ Equilibrium in a civilized jungle ⋮ The core for housing markets with limited externalities ⋮ Empirical content of classic assignment methods: jungle and market economy ⋮ Constrained-optimal tradewise-stable outcomes in the one-sided assignment game: a solution concept weaker than the core ⋮ New axioms for top trading cycles ⋮ Reallocation with priorities and minimal envy mechanisms ⋮ Preference revelation games and strict cores of multiple‐type housing market problems ⋮ The top‐trading cycles and chains solution for kidney exchange with immunosuppressants ⋮ Optimal assignment mechanisms with imperfect verification ⋮ All sequential allotment rules are obviously strategy‐proof ⋮ The enemy of my enemy is my friend: new conditions for network games ⋮ Strategy-proof and envy-free mechanisms for house allocation ⋮ Object reallocation problems with single-dipped preferences ⋮ Characterizing the TTC rule via pair-efficiency: a short proof ⋮ On two mechanisms in job rotation problems ⋮ Non-vetoed matching with status quo ⋮ Housing markets since Shapley and Scarf ⋮ Maximal domains for strategy-proof pairwise exchange ⋮ Multi-agent task allocation under unrestricted environments ⋮ Double implementation in dominant strategy equilibria and ex-post equilibria with private values ⋮ Exchange of indivisible goods under matroid constraints ⋮ School choice with transferable student characteristics ⋮ Stability of an allocation of objects ⋮ Outside options in neutral allocation of discrete resources ⋮ A unified approach to strategy-proofness of the deferred-acceptance rule and the top-trading cycles rule ⋮ Novel integer programming models for the stable kidney exchange problem ⋮ Top trading cycles with reordering: improving match priority in school choice ⋮ Implementation in strong core by codes of rights ⋮ On the unique core partition of coalition formation games: correction to İnal (2015) ⋮ Some characterizations of generalized top trading cycles ⋮ Reallocation with priorities ⋮ Coalitional stability in matching problems with externalities and random preferences ⋮ Expectational equilibria in many-to-one matching models with contracts ⋮ matchingMarkets ⋮ House allocation with transfers ⋮ Hardness results for stable exchange problems

Cites Work