Buyer feedback as a filtering mechanism for reputable sellers

DOI10.1016/S0378-4371(02)01215-3zbMath1001.91034arXivphysics/0207020OpenAlexW2078693329MaRDI QIDQ1847460

Paolo Laureti, Yi-Kuo Yu, František Slanina, Yi-Cheng Zhang

Publication date: 26 November 2002

Published in: Physica A (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/physics/0207020

zbMATH Keywords

enhanced transaction volumeinternal-market continuum modelmutual beneficial symbiosis

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (2)

Matching games with partial information ⋮ The stable marriage problem: an interdisciplinary review from the physicist's perspective

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• On the anti-Wishart distribution
• Expectations, drift, and volatility in evolutionary games
• The Contributions of the Economics of Information to Twentieth Century Economics
• Happier world with more information

This page was built for publication: Buyer feedback as a filtering mechanism for reputable sellers