Dominance solvability of second-price auctions with differential information

DOI10.1016/S0304-4068(02)00018-6zbMath1027.91032MaRDI QIDQ1850153

Ezra Einy, Ori Haimanko, Aner Sela, Ram Orzach

Publication date: 2 December 2002

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

Differential informationCommon-value second-price auctionsDominance solvabilityInformation advantageSophisticated equilibria

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (11)

Common-value all-pay auctions with asymmetric information and bid caps ⋮ Knowing your opponents: information disclosure and auction design ⋮ Information Asymmetries in Common-Value Auctions with Discrete Signals ⋮ Information in Tullock contests ⋮ Equilibrium and revenue in a family of common-value first-price auctions with differential information ⋮ Dominance-solvable common-value large auctions ⋮ Peaches, lemons, and cookies: designing auction markets with dispersed information ⋮ Core-stable rings in second price auctions with common values ⋮ Common-value all-pay auctions with asymmetric information ⋮ On the choice of obtaining and disclosing the common value in auctions ⋮ Revenue comparison in common-value auctions: two examples

Cites Work

• Incomplete information, incentive compatibility, and the core
• Dominant strategies, superior information, and winner's curse in second-price auctions
• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
• Bayesian Implementation
• A Bidding Model of Perfect Competition
• A Class of Dominance Solvable Common-Value Auctions

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