Comparing bargaining solutions in the shadow of conflict: how norms against threats can have real effects
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Publication:1851226
DOI10.1006/jeth.2001.2828zbMath1018.91003OpenAlexW2001609248MaRDI QIDQ1851226
Stergios Skaperdas, Constantinos Syropoulos, Nejat Anbarci
Publication date: 16 December 2002
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/c3fcd8992ba97cdb6860551c9f94717f028482f9
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Cites Work
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- Comparing bargaining solutions in the shadow of conflict: how norms against threats can have real effects
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