Asymptotic revenue equivalence in auctions
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Publication:1851233
DOI10.1006/jeth.2001.2870zbMath1023.91016OpenAlexW1994054327MaRDI QIDQ1851233
Publication date: 16 December 2002
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.2001.2870
Related Items
The relationship between the allocation of goods and a seller's revenue ⋮ Matching in the large: an experimental study ⋮ Large all-pay auctions with IPV bidders ⋮ On the informational inefficiency of discriminatory price auctions ⋮ I want to tell you? Maximizing revenue in first-price two-stage auctions ⋮ Numerical simulations of asymmetric first-price auctions ⋮ Revenue Equivalence of Large Asymmetric Auctions ⋮ Large auctions with risk-averse bidders ⋮ Large common value auctions with risk averse bidders
Cites Work
- A Convergence Theorem for Competitive Bidding with Differential Information
- Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions
- Rational Expectations, Information Acquisition, and Competitive Bidding
- A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
- Optimal Auction Design
- Correlated Information and Mecanism Design
- A Bidding Model of Perfect Competition
- Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem
- Efficiency of Large Private Value Auctions
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