Asymptotic revenue equivalence in auctions

DOI10.1006/jeth.2001.2870zbMath1023.91016OpenAlexW1994054327MaRDI QIDQ1851233

Yanyan Li

Publication date: 16 December 2002

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.2001.2870

zbMATH Keywords

auctionsmechanismsrevenue equivalence

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items

The relationship between the allocation of goods and a seller's revenue ⋮ Matching in the large: an experimental study ⋮ Large all-pay auctions with IPV bidders ⋮ On the informational inefficiency of discriminatory price auctions ⋮ I want to tell you? Maximizing revenue in first-price two-stage auctions ⋮ Numerical simulations of asymmetric first-price auctions ⋮ Revenue Equivalence of Large Asymmetric Auctions ⋮ Large auctions with risk-averse bidders ⋮ Large common value auctions with risk averse bidders

Cites Work

• A Convergence Theorem for Competitive Bidding with Differential Information
• Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions
• Rational Expectations, Information Acquisition, and Competitive Bidding
• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
• Optimal Auction Design
• Correlated Information and Mecanism Design
• A Bidding Model of Perfect Competition
• Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem
• Efficiency of Large Private Value Auctions

This page was built for publication: Asymptotic revenue equivalence in auctions