On monopolistic licensing strategies under asymmetric information

DOI10.1006/jeth.2001.2863zbMath1022.91036DBLPjournals/jet/Schmitz02OpenAlexW3122560212WikidataQ29544424 ScholiaQ29544424MaRDI QIDQ1851234

Patrick W. Schmitz

Publication date: 16 December 2002

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/2708664d1547516044d6120ef3bd0752b89ddce8

zbMATH Keywords

innovationprivate informationmonopolylicenses

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38)

Related Items (6)

General licensing schemes for a cost-reducing innovation ⋮ Information disclosure through technology licensing ⋮ Licensing and information disclosure under asymmetric information ⋮ On the licensing of a technology with unknown use ⋮ Technology licensing under optimal tax policy ⋮ Technology licensing between rival firms in presence of asymmetric information

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
• Optimal license fees for a new product
• Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems
• Optimal licensing of cost-reducing innovation
• Pollution claim settlements under private information
• Participation constraints in adverse selection models
• Countervailing incentives in agency problems
• Status quo bias in bargaining: an extension of the Myerson-Satterthwaite theorem with an application to the Coase theorem.
• Subgame Perfect Implementation
• Optimal Auction Design
• Contracting with Externalities

This page was built for publication: On monopolistic licensing strategies under asymmetric information