Credit contracting and bidding under wealth constraints.

DOI10.1007/S00199-001-0235-XzbMath1037.91037OpenAlexW1984928984MaRDI QIDQ1852657

James A. Vercammen, Charles E. Hyde

Publication date: 26 January 2003

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-001-0235-x

zbMATH Keywords

auctionsmarket modelsmathematical economicsinformation asymmetrycredit marketloan contractsfinancial constrains

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Research exposition (monographs, survey articles) pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-02) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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Endogenous budget constraints in auctions

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