Allocating multiple units

DOI10.1007/s00199-001-0251-xzbMath1014.91034OpenAlexW3121815469MaRDI QIDQ1852658

Kala Krishna, Torben Tranæs

Publication date: 26 January 2003

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-001-0251-x

zbMATH Keywords

revenue equivalencefirst-price vs second-price auctionsmenu auctionsmultiple-unit auctions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (3)

ON THE COMPLETE INFORMATION FIRST-PRICE AUCTION AND ITS INTUITIVE SOLUTION ⋮ Weak and strong multimarket bidding rings ⋮ Trading with a common agent under complete information: A characterization of Nash equilibria

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