Core rationalizability in two-agent exchange economies.

DOI10.1007/s00199-001-0241-zzbMath1037.91068OpenAlexW2002204683MaRDI QIDQ1852661

Yves Sprumont, Walter Bossert

Publication date: 2002

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.ruf.rice.edu/~econ/papers/2000papers/07Bossert.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

collective rationalityPareto set of allocationsrationalizability corestwo-agent exchange economics

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Group preferences (91B10) Individual preferences (91B08) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Social choice (91B14)

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