A leximin characterization of strategy-proof and non-resolute social choice procedures
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Publication:1852663
DOI10.1007/s00199-001-0239-6zbMath1028.91017OpenAlexW2063083462MaRDI QIDQ1852663
Jerry S. Kelly, Donald E. Campbell
Publication date: 26 January 2003
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-001-0239-6
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