Continuity of the first price auction Nash equilibrium correspondence.

DOI10.1007/S001990100227zbMath1037.91040OpenAlexW2065288011MaRDI QIDQ1852669

Bernard Lebrun

Publication date: 2002

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s001990100227

zbMATH Keywords

First price auctionNash Equilibrium Correspondence

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (9)

First-price auctions where one of the bidders' valuations is common knowledge ⋮ Weak and strong multimarket bidding rings ⋮ Asymmetric first-price auctions with uniform distributions: analytic solutions to the general case ⋮ Asymmetry and revenue in first-price auctions ⋮ A NOTE ON DISCRETE BID FIRST-PRICE AUCTION WITH GENERAL VALUE DISTRIBUTION ⋮ Uniqueness of the equilibrium in first-price auctions ⋮ Ranking reversals in asymmetric auctions ⋮ Revenue-superior variants of the second-price auction ⋮ Revenue Comparison in Asymmetric Auctions with Discrete Valuations

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