How much should central banks talk?: A new argument

DOI10.1016/S0165-1765(02)00125-8zbMath1027.91504OpenAlexW3124477579MaRDI QIDQ1852904

Hans Peter Grüner

Publication date: 21 January 2003

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-1765(02)00125-8

zbMATH Keywords

CommunicationCentral bank transparencyInflation uncertainty

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Related Items (5)

STATIC AND DYNAMIC EFFECTS OF CENTRAL BANK TRANSPARENCY ⋮ Inflation uncertainty and unemployment uncertainty: why transparency about monetary policy targets matters ⋮ Uncertainty and fiscal policy in an asymmetric monetary union ⋮ Monetary accommodation, imperfect central bank transparency and optimal delegation ⋮ Monetary accommodation and unemployment: why central bank transparency matters

Cites Work

• Should the individual voting records of central bankers be published?
• Political uncertainty and macroeconomic performance
• How Will EMU Affect Inflation and Unemployment in Europe?

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