Hybrid auctions.

DOI10.1016/S0165-1765(02)00140-4zbMath1158.91359OpenAlexW4232409157MaRDI QIDQ1852927

Joisa C. Dutra, Flavio M. Menezes

Publication date: 21 January 2003

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-1765(02)00140-4

zbMATH Keywords

Expected revenueMulti-stage auctions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (2)

I want to tell you? Maximizing revenue in first-price two-stage auctions ⋮ Hybrid mechanisms for Vickrey-Clarke-Groves and generalized second-price bids

Cites Work

• A sealed-bid auction that matches the English auction
• Optimal Auction Design
• Equilibrium in Sealed High Bid Auctions

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