Dynamic production teams with strategic behavior

DOI10.1016/S0165-1889(02)00019-2zbMath1023.91038MaRDI QIDQ1853229

Michèle Breton, Pascal St-Amour, Désiré Vencatachellum

Publication date: 21 January 2003

Published in: Journal of Economic Dynamics \& Control (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

dynamic gamescompulsory teamsintergenerational teams

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Dynamic games (91A25)

Cites Work

• Matching, search, and bargaining
• A repeated game with finitely lived overlapping generations of players
• Folk theorems in overlapping generations games
• Endogenous strategic business cycles
• Intertemporal transfer institutions
• Dynamic allocation in a altruistic overlapping generations economy
• Optimal Contracts for Teams
• Informational Constraints and the Overlapping Generations Model: Folk and Anti-Folk Theorems
• Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
• Repeated Games Played by Overlapping Generations of Players
• The Dynamics of Learning with Team Production: Implications for Task Assignment
• Optimal Contracts for Teams: A Note on the Results of McAfee and McMillan
• Incentives to Help in Multi-Agent Situations

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