Generalizations of the concept of core of simple games and their characterization in terms of permission of voters.

DOI10.1016/S0096-3003(01)00175-8zbMath1040.91034OpenAlexW2109463843MaRDI QIDQ1855817

Takehiro Inohara

Publication date: 28 January 2003

Published in: Applied Mathematics and Computation (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0096-3003(01)00175-8

zbMATH Keywords

CommitteesSimple games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Voting theory (91B12)

Related Items (4)

A Model of Consensus and Consensus Building Within the Framework of Committees with Permissible Ranges of Decision Makers ⋮ Self-consistency of decision rules for group decision making ⋮ Equilibrium and efficiency in conflict analysis incorporating permissibility ⋮ A general model for voting systems with multiple alternatives

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• On conditions for a meeting not to reach a deadlock
• New interpretation of the core of simple games in terms of voters' permission.

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