Efficient contracting and fair play in a simple principal-agent experiment

DOI10.1023/A:1016380207200zbMath1030.91509OpenAlexW4237047271WikidataQ57858091 ScholiaQ57858091MaRDI QIDQ1862143

Vital Anderhub, Simon Gächter, Manfred Königstein

Publication date: 10 March 2003

Published in: Experimental Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1023/a:1016380207200

zbMATH Keywords

experimentscontract theoryreciprocityincentive contractsprincipal-agent theoryfair sharing

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Related Items (3)

Bonus or flat wage? An experiment into the principal-agent problem ⋮ Goal setting in the principal-agent model: weak incentives for strong performance ⋮ An experimental investigation of the `tenuous trade-off' between risk and incentives in organizations

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