On asymptotic strategy-proofness of classical social choice rules
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Publication:1863937
DOI10.1023/A:1020240214900zbMath1036.91009OpenAlexW1526942341MaRDI QIDQ1863937
Publication date: 12 March 2003
Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1023/a:1020240214900
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