Conventions and local interaction structures: experimental evidence.

DOI10.1006/game.2001.0897zbMath1092.91513OpenAlexW2569321910MaRDI QIDQ1864798

Karl-Martin Ehrhart, Siegfried K. Berninghaus, Claudia Keser

Publication date: 23 March 2003

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://cirano.qc.ca/files/publications/2000s-36.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

coordination gamesexperimental economicslocal interaction

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Experimental studies (91A90)

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