Backward induction and the game-theoretic analysis of chess.

DOI10.1006/game.2001.0900zbMath1092.91503OpenAlexW2060556731MaRDI QIDQ1864799

Christian Ewerhart

Publication date: 23 March 2003

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.2001.0900

zbMATH Keywords

chessminmax theoremZermelo's theorem

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games in extensive form (91A18)

Related Items (2)

Lloyd Shapley and chess with imperfect information ⋮ On Nash equilibria and improvement cycles in pure positional strategies for chess-like and backgammon-like \(n\)-person games

Cites Work

• Chess-like games are dominance solvable in at most two steps
• Zermelo and the early history of game theory
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item

This page was built for publication: Backward induction and the game-theoretic analysis of chess.