Equilibrium of affiliated value second price auctions with financially constrained bidders: The two-bidder case
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Publication:1864800
DOI10.1006/game.2001.0896zbMath1031.91035OpenAlexW2136040603MaRDI QIDQ1864800
Hanming Fang, Sérgio O. Parreiras
Publication date: 23 March 2003
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/2cb3d523ef3f5a1522d52dbc987f582845417521
Related Items (11)
Endogenous budget constraints ⋮ Mechanism design with budget constraints and a population of agents ⋮ Budget constraints in homogenous multi-unit auctions ⋮ On the failure of the linkage principle with financially constrained bidders. ⋮ Endogenous budget constraints in auctions ⋮ Efficient ex post implementable auctions and English auctions for bidders with non-quasilinear preferences ⋮ On the continuous equilibria of affiliated-value, all-pay auctions with private budget constraints ⋮ The war of attrition and the revelation of valuable information ⋮ Simultaneous auctions with budgets: equilibrium existence and characterization ⋮ Second-price common-value auctions under multidimensional uncertainty ⋮ Simultaneous ascending auctions with complementarities and known budget constraints
Cites Work
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- Expected revenue of all-pay auctions and first-price sealed-bid auctions with budget constraints
- An analysis of the war of attrition and the all-pay auction
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- Multiple-Object Auctions with Budget Constrained Bidders
- Strategic Jump Bidding in English Auctions
- Standard Auctions with Financially Constrained Bidders
- A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
- High bids and broke winners
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