In defense of DEFECT.

DOI10.1006/game.2001.0893zbMath1035.91015OpenAlexW2119426597MaRDI QIDQ1864806

Oscar Volij

Publication date: 23 March 2003

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/dee3737b33683c26965b9ee16815aca47f9dac53

zbMATH Keywords

finite automatadefectionPrisoners' dilemmamachine game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Evolutionary games (91A22) Theory of computing (68Q99)

Related Items (7)

Evolutionary stability in repeated extensive games played by finite automata ⋮ Hamilton's rule ⋮ In and out of equilibrium. II: Evolution in repeated games with discounting and complexity costs ⋮ In and out of equilibrium. I: Evolution of strategies in repeated games with discounting. ⋮ Evolutionary stability and lexicographic preferences. ⋮ Adaptation and complexity in repeated games ⋮ Leave and let leave: a sufficient condition to explain the evolutionary emergence of cooperation

Cites Work

• Stochastic evolutionary game dynamics
• Finite automata play the repeated prisoner's dilemma
• Evolutionary stability in repeated games played by finite automata
• Optimal control of diffusion processes with reflection
• The evolution of exchange.
• An evolutionary model of bargaining
• Supergames played by finite automata with finite costs of complexity in an evolutionary setting
• The Structure of Nash Equilibrium in Repeated Games with Finite Automata
• The Evolution of Walrasian Behavior
• Evolution with State-Dependent Mutations
• Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games
• The Evolution of Conventions
• The Logic of Animal Conflict

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