The maximum efficient equilibrium payoff in the repeated prisoners' dilemma.

DOI10.1006/game.2001.0901zbMath1092.91505OpenAlexW3122428915MaRDI QIDQ1864811

George J. Mailath, Tadashi Sekiguchi, Ichiro Obara

Publication date: 23 March 2003

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.2001.0901

zbMATH Keywords

repeated gamesmonitoringequilibrium payoffsperfectrepeated Prisoners' Dilemma

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) 2-person games (91A05) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (13)

Self-accessibility and repeated games with asymmetric discounting ⋮ The optimal degree of cooperation in the repeated prisoners' dilemma with side payments ⋮ How fast do equilibrium payoff sets converge in repeated games? ⋮ Construction of subgame-perfect mixed-strategy equilibria in repeated games ⋮ Infinitely repeated games with public monitoring and monetary transfers ⋮ Renegotiation-proof relational contracts ⋮ Set-valued games and mixed-strategy equilibria in discounted supergames ⋮ Efficient outcomes in repeated games with limited monitoring ⋮ Equilibrium paths in discounted supergames ⋮ Repeated games with present-biased preferences ⋮ The use of public randomization in discounted repeated games ⋮ FRACTAL GEOMETRY OF EQUILIBRIUM PAYOFFS IN DISCOUNTED SUPERGAMES ⋮ On the size and structure of group cooperation

Cites Work

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• Extremal equlibria of oligopolistic supergames
• Equilibrium and perfection in discounted supergames
• The graph of Prisoners' Dilemma supergame payoffs as a function of the discount factor
• Strongly symmetric subgame perfect equilibria in infinitely repeated games with perfect monitoring and discounting
• On Repeated Games with Complete Information
• Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring

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