An evolutionary analysis of insurance markets with adverse selection.

DOI10.1016/S0899-8256(02)00002-7zbMath1033.91018MaRDI QIDQ1864813

Thomas Tröger, Ana B. Ania, Achim Wambach

Publication date: 23 March 2003

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

Bounded rationalityStochastic stabilityImitationAdverse selectionInsurance marketsLocal experiments

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Related Items

Adverse selection, heterogeneous beliefs, and evolutionary learning ⋮ Evolutionary Game Theory ⋮ Evolutionary game dynamics ⋮ (Neutrally) optimal mechanism under adverse selection: the canonical insurance problem ⋮ Games with coupled populations: an experiment in continuous time ⋮ Contract withdrawals and equilibrium in competitive markets with adverse selection ⋮ THE DISCRETIZATION OF CONTINUUM STRATEGY SPACES

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