Cooperative vs non-cooperative truels: little agreement, but does that matter?

DOI10.1016/S0899-8256(02)00004-0zbMath1092.91500MaRDI QIDQ1864814

Steven J. Brams, D. Marc Kilgour, Walter Bossert

Publication date: 23 March 2003

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriumCoreTruel

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Cooperative games (91A12) (n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06)

Related Items (3)

Game of the truel ⋮ The robustness of `enemy-of-my-enemy-is-my-friend' alliances ⋮ Stabilizing Power Sharing

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• The sequential truel
• Equilibrium points of infinite sequential truels
• Backward induction is not robust: The parity problem and the uncertainty problem
• The simultaneous truel
• Non-cooperative games
• Von Neumann-Morgenstern solutions to cooperative games without side payments
• The Core of a Cooperative Game Without Side Payments
• The Truel
• Theory of Moves

This page was built for publication: Cooperative vs non-cooperative truels: little agreement, but does that matter?