A myopic adjustment process leading to best-reply matching.
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Publication:1864817
DOI10.1016/S0899-8256(02)00007-6zbMath1033.91034MaRDI QIDQ1864817
Mark Voorneveld, Michael Kosfeld, Edward Droste
Publication date: 23 March 2003
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Noncooperative games (91A10) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Matching models (91B68)
Related Items (11)
The cutting power of preparation ⋮ Statistical inference in evolutionary dynamics ⋮ Stability of strict equilibria in best experienced payoff dynamics: simple formulas and applications ⋮ Market Exit and Minimax Regret ⋮ Best-reply matching in games. ⋮ Instability of defection in the prisoner's dilemma under best experienced payoff dynamics ⋮ Second-Price All-Pay Auctions and Best-Reply Matching Equilibria ⋮ An introduction to \textit{ABED}: agent-based simulation of evolutionary game dynamics ⋮ Stability for best experienced payoff dynamics ⋮ A stochastic stability analysis with observation errors in normal form games ⋮ Time-inconsistent stopping, myopic adjustment and equilibrium stability: with a mean-variance application
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- Experience-weighted Attraction Learning in Normal Form Games
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