A myopic adjustment process leading to best-reply matching.

DOI10.1016/S0899-8256(02)00007-6zbMath1033.91034MaRDI QIDQ1864817

Mark Voorneveld, Michael Kosfeld, Edward Droste

Publication date: 23 March 2003

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

MatchingLearningBest replyMyopic adjustment

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Matching models (91B68)

Related Items (11)

The cutting power of preparation ⋮ Statistical inference in evolutionary dynamics ⋮ Stability of strict equilibria in best experienced payoff dynamics: simple formulas and applications ⋮ Market Exit and Minimax Regret ⋮ Best-reply matching in games. ⋮ Instability of defection in the prisoner's dilemma under best experienced payoff dynamics ⋮ Second-Price All-Pay Auctions and Best-Reply Matching Equilibria ⋮ An introduction to \textit{ABED}: agent-based simulation of evolutionary game dynamics ⋮ Stability for best experienced payoff dynamics ⋮ A stochastic stability analysis with observation errors in normal form games ⋮ Time-inconsistent stopping, myopic adjustment and equilibrium stability: with a mean-variance application

Cites Work

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• On the Convergence of Fictitious Play
• A Simple Adaptive Procedure Leading to Correlated Equilibrium
• Experience-weighted Attraction Learning in Normal Form Games

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