Welfare reducing licensing.

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Publication:1864822

DOI10.1016/S0899-8256(02)00513-4zbMath1033.91021MaRDI QIDQ1864822

Ramon Faulí-Oller, Joel Sandonís

Publication date: 23 March 2003

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)




Related Items (27)

General licensing schemes for a cost-reducing innovationLicensing under general demand and cost functionsPrivatization in the presence of patent licensingRevenue royaltiesProfit-sharing licensingTechnology licensing, R\&D and welfareComparing Bertrand and Cournot in mixed marketsTechnology licensing and collusionUpstream privatization and downstream licensingLicensing cost‐reducing innovations under supply function competitionImpact of technology development costs on licensing form in a differentiated Cournot duopolyExclusive and non-exclusive licensing with shelvingChoosing a licensee from heterogeneous rivalsPatent strength and optimal two-part tariff licensing with a potential rivalThe welfare effect of bargaining power in the licensing of a cost-reducing technologyOn the Markovian efficiency of Bertrand and Cournot equilibriaUnionized labor market and licensing by a monopolistLocation equilibrium with asymmetric firms: the role of licensingRoyalty licensingA comment on ``welfare reducing licensingLicensing of a quality-improving innovationTechnology licensing under optimal tax policyIntra-brand patent licensing with inter-brand competitionTechnology licensing under product differentiationWelfare reducing vertical licensing in the presence of complementary inputsTechnology licensing between rival firms in presence of asymmetric informationThe choice of prices versus quantities under outsourcing



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