Subgame-perfect implementation of bargaining solutions.

DOI10.1016/S0899-8256(02)00500-6zbMath1037.91008MaRDI QIDQ1864826

Eiichi Miyagawa

Publication date: 23 March 2003

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

Nash programMechanism designAlternating offersComplete information

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) 2-person games (91A05)

Related Items

Nash implementation and the bargaining problem ⋮ Timing effect in bargaining and ex ante efficiency of the relative utilitarian solution ⋮ Random extensive form games ⋮ Nash demand game and the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution ⋮ Subgame-perfect implementation of bargaining solutions: comment ⋮ On the axiomatic theory of bargaining: a survey of recent results ⋮ Partially-honest Nash implementation: a full characterization ⋮ Implementing equal division with an ultimatum threat ⋮ A noncooperative foundation of the competitive divisions for bads ⋮ A note on implementation of bargaining solutions ⋮ Manipulation of preferences and relative utilitarianism ⋮ Between anchors and aspirations: a new family of bargaining solutions ⋮ Two support results for the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution in small object division markets ⋮ Dominant strategy implementation of bargaining solutions ⋮ On the implementation of the L-Nash bargaining solution in two-person bargaining games ⋮ From jungle to civilized economy: the power foundation of exchange economy equilibrium ⋮ Revising claims and resisting ultimatums in bargaining problems

Cites Work

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